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UNDERSTANDING AND DEFENDING AGAINST
MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL PEER REVIEW ANTITRUST
CLAIMS
Daniel M. Warnert
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PEER REVIEW, AND
ANTITRUST

Observers dispute whether there really is a "crisis" in medical
malpractice litigation and in the availability and cost of malpractice
insurance.! It is not disputed, however, that Americans spend a large
sum of money on health care. Such expenditures amounted to approximately 12"70 of the gross national product in 1989, up from
7.4% in 1970. 2 A deep-rooted perception is that a part of the increase
in the cost of health care, maybe a large part, is caused by "explosive" increases in malpractice claims; doctors often perform redundant, exhaustive, and expensive tests to protect themselves from
t B.A., 1971, University of Washington; J.D., 1975, University of Washington
School of Law; M.A., 1977, Western Washington University. Associate Professor, Dept. of Accounting (Business Law), College of Business; Western
Washington University, Bellingham, WA.
1. See PETER HUBER, THE LIABILITY CRISIS (1988). See also, William B. Glaberson
& Christopher Farrell, The Explosion in Liability Lawsuits is Nothing but a
Myth, Bus. WK., April 21, 1986, at 24 (arguing that tort reformists' calls for
reform are premised on myths surrounding the nature and extent of the socalled litigation explosion). For a complete examination of the alleged crisis,
see Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 683, 684-90 (1991) (examining
the arguments on each side at length). See also Randall Bovbjerg, Legislation

on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary Report Card,
22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 499, 500-10 (1989) (discussing the "crisis").
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVo 425 (1991). Personal health insurance costs
increased at an annual rate of 20.7070 for the period 1980-85, and 11.1% for
1985-88. Id. at 430. The cost of health insurance for a typical employee and
his or her dependents in Los Angeles was found to be $7,577 per year,
compared to $3,197 per year in Glen Falls, New York, according to a survey
undertaken by actuarial consultants Milliman & Roberson, Inc. Gene Koretz,
Where Employers Can Find Sanctuary, Bus. WK., December 16, 1991 at 20.
The survey was based on typical group health insurance packages. Id. The
total amount of Gross National Product spent on health care in the United
States is estimated at $671 billion, or $2,660 per person (1. Ratner, The High
Cost of Health, 13 G.A.D. 3).
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potential liability. The perceived increase in malpractice claims has
generated calls for better mechanisms to identify and weed out bad
doctors. If successful, this would reduce malpractice and the necessity
for defensive testing and procedures, thereby lowering malpractice
insurance rates and ultimately reducing medical costs.
The mechanisms currently used to police the medical profession
are the threat of malpractice claims, the regulating activities of state
licensing boards, and peer review. One observer has asserted that
neither the threat of malpractice claims nor state oversight are
sufficient deterrents. 3 Peer review usually involves a group of local
doctors, and sometimes staff members, conducting a hearing to
determine whether the subject physician has provided competent
service. It does, however, have inherent weaknesses. Undoubtedly,
many doctors are reluctant to criticize members of their own profession. As one commentator has observed, "physicians who serve on
peer review boards make neither money nor friends. "4 One thing
reviewing physicians can make, however, is a tempting target for
litigation by physicians subject to such revjew. Doctors facing disciplinary action may bring claims for various torts including defamation, denial of due process, and tortious interference with business
relations. s Even more potentially damaging are claims that peer
reviewers are engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation
of antitrust laws.
The antitrust claim which may be asserted is that the peer review
boards are engaged in a conspiracy to drive the physician under
review out of business in order to reduce competition. These "group
boycott" claims are serious because the' physician-defendants are
3. Adler, supra note 1, at 692-96. Robert Adler argues that the state boards are
seriously underfunded, that many members of such bars are uncomfortable
judging their peers, and the boards "rarely have good sources of information
regarding lapses in physicians' services." [d. at 693-94. The threat of malpractice claims is an insufficient deterrent "because insurance, rather than physicians, usually pays claims, and because insurance premiums are typically based
on type of practice rather than on any specific physician's litigation record."
[d. at 695 n.3. Additionally, the forum courts that adjudicate such malpractice
claims "have no direct authority to suspend or remove a physician from
practice." [d.
4. [d. at 697.
5. See, e.g., Decker v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 434 (lOth Cir. 1992)
(involving suit by plaintiff doctor against peer review panel members and the
hospital for "breach of various contractual and common law tort duties;
violations of the Sherman Act, RICO, and the federal extortion statute;
violations of similar Utah statutes; and conspiracy to deprive Dr. Decker of
his civil rights"); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 732 (9th Cir. 1992)
(involving suit by plaintiff for "antitrust violations ... civil rights violations
... and pendent state law claims of conspiracy and intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage").
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subject to treble damages under antitrust laws,6 and because such
damages are not covered by insurance. 7 In response to the chilling
effect such claims have on vigorous peer review, Congress adopted
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 19868 to provide some
degree of antitrust immunity by restricting the circumstances under
which. peer reviewers face the threat of antitrust liability.
This Article provides background on group boycott law and
examines some antitrust implications of the physician peer review
process in view of recent trends to change traditional group boycott
analysis. Also considered are the impact of the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act on peer review boycott cases and recent Supreme
Court analysis of the Act. Finally, the Article discusses possible
defenses to claims of antitrust violations brought against members
of medical peer review committees.
II. PROFESSIONAL GROUP BOYCOTT CASES: THE
EROSION OF TRADITIONAL PER SE ANALYSIS
A.

Traditional Analysis

Until recently, the antitrust analysis used by the Supreme Court
held that horizontal boycotts were illegal per se. 9 A horizontal boycott
consists of a concerted refusal to deal among competitors at the same
level of market structure as the target of the boycott. JO Early Supreme
Court cases went so far as to suggest that every restraint of trade
was condemned by Congress with the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act ("the Sherman Act").11 No proof that competitive harm
6. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (tripling jury award of $650,000 to
$1,950,000).
7. Adler, supra note I, at 699 n.82. The American Medical Association is noted
as arguing that those alarmed at the Patrick v. Burget award were concerned
that "'doctors who seek to discipline other doctors they consider incompetent
should not be put at risk of huge damage awards for which insurance is not
available, whenever a jury can be convinced their motives were not pure.'"
Id. (quoting Stuart Taylor, Jr., Doctors Can Sue in Peer Reviews, Justices
Dec/are, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1988, at I).
8. 42 U.S.C. § IHOI (1993).
9. See, e.g., Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc~, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)
(holding that a concerted refusal to deal constituted a per se violation of the
Sherman Act).
10. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 101 (1987).
II. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312-13
(1897) (stating that the Sherman Act provides that "every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states or with foreign nations" is declared to be
illegal).
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resulted was needed in per se casesY Two well-known cases serve as
examples.
In Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hall Stores, Inc., 13 the plaintiff
owned a retail appliance store. He charged that the defendants (a
competing appliance retailer, its manufacturers, and their distributors)
had conspired not to sell appliances to him or to sell only on
discriminatory and unfair terms}4 The defendants did not dispute
the allegations, but "showed that there were hundreds of other
household appliance retailers, some within a few blocks of Klors
who sold many competing brands, including those the defendants
refused to sell to Klors. "IS The district court and the court of appeals
then found that, notwithstanding the apparent conspiracy, there was
still vigorous competition in the appliance business, no public harm,
and therefore no Sherman Act violation. 16 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court quoted from Standard Oil Co. v. United States,17
construing the Sherman Act to prohibit and denounce all "contracts
or acts which ... had a monopolistic tendencY,"18 and said this kind
of group boycott had "long been held to be in the forbidden
category" 19 that could not be saved from illegality by showing that
it regulated prices, or brought about no deterioration in quality.
Such agreements "cripple[d] the freedom of traders and thereby
restrain[ed] their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment."2O Demonstration of an effect on prices is not essential to a
Sherman Act violation. 21
The second familiar example is United States v. General Motors
Corp. ,22 which involved a more egregious restraint of trade. A number
12. [d. See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-47

(1966) (finding restraint of trade in violation of Sherman Act where General
Motors collaborated with dealers and associations to eliminate competitors by
terminating dealings between them and a l,J1inority of Chevrolet dealers and to
deprive franchised dealers of the choice of dealing through discounters) ..
13. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
14. [d. at 207-09.
15. [d. at 210.
16. [d.

17. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
18. Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 57 (1911».
19. [d. at 212.
20. [d. at 212 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram and Sons, 340 U.S. 211
(1951».
21. "This is not a case of a single trader refusing to deal with another, nor even
of a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship. Alleged
in this complaint is a wide combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors
and a retailer. . . . It interferes with the natural flow of commerce." [d. at
212-13.
22. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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of Los Angeles area General Motors (GM) dealers complained to the
car manufacturer about "discount house" sales operations that were
run directly or indirectly by franchised dealers.23 Such "discount
houses" were, according to the complaining dealers, in breach of the
"location clause" of the Dealer Selling Agreement, and the sale by
discounters left the non-discounters with the burden of performing
free new car warranty work (for which they were not compensated
by GM) and time consuming "pre-conditioning" which was required
by both GM and the market.24 GM obtained from each dealer in the
area a promise not to do business with the discounters, and three
dealer organizations undertook to police the agreement. 2S They hired
a professional investigator who was instructed to try to purchase new
Chevrolets from the proscribed outlets, to tape record the transactions
and to gather evidence to lay "at the doorstep of Chevrolet. "26 The
wayward dealers were forced to repurchase the cars and to promise
to end their discount operations.27 A criminal trial against the defendants resulted in a not guilty verdict. 28 Subsequently the civil trial
court found for the defendants, but the Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Fortas said:
We have here a classic conspiracy in restraint of trade: joint,
collaborative action by dealers, appellee associations, and
General Motors to eliminate a class of competitors by
terminating business dealings between them and a minority
of Chevrolet dealers and to deprive franchised dealers of
their freedom to contract through discounters if they so
choose. 29
The usual apologies for this kind of joint activity, which preserves
the collaborators' profit margins or their distribution system, were
sharply dismissed as wholly unacceptable. This kind of activity, the
Court said, is per se illegal and falls into that category of agreements
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use .... The principle of these cases is that
where businessmen concert their actions in order to deprive
23. [d. at 129-35.
24. [d. at 133.
25. [d. at 136.
26. /d. at 137.
27. [d. at 138.
28. [d.
29. /d. at 140.
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others of access to merchandise which the latter wish to sell
to the public, we need not inquire into the economic motivation underlying their conduct. 30

B.

The Erosion oj Per se Analysis: Commodities
The Court's vigorous denunciati'on of concerted horizontal boycotts as being illegal per se has changed; the category of restraints
to be considered using per se analysis is decreasing. With respect to
commodity commerce, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing CO.31 is a notable case. Northwest Wholesale Stationers was a purchasing co-operative made up of about 100
office supply retailers in the Pacific Northwest, acting as the primary
wholesaler for the retailers. 32 Although non-members could purchase
wholesale supplies from Northwest, members received an end-of-the
year percentage rebate;33 members, therefore, had a significant price
advantage. In 1978 the membership of Northwest voted to expel
Pacific Stationery.34 Pacific had apparently violated one or more of
the "reasonable rules [co-ops] must establish in order to function
effectively."3s Pacific sued, contending that its expUlsion from the
co-operative without procedural safeguards was a group boycott and
therefore a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 36 Finding
no anticompetitive effects on the basis of the record as presented,
the district court granted summary judgment for the defendantsY
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding "that
the uncontroverted facts of this case support a finding of per se
liability. ' '38
The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Ninth Circuit
and held that the absence of procedural safeguards had nothing to
do with antitrust violations. If the acts of the co-op amounted to a
per se Sherman Act violation, "no amount of procedural protection
would [have] save[d] it. "39 While it is clear that group boycotts were
per se illegal,40 it is less clear what constitutes a group boycott.
Usually the boycott involves a conspiracy to deny something a
[d. at 146.
472 U.S. 284 (1985).
[d. at 286.
[d.
[d. at 287.
[d. at 296.
[d. at 288.
[d.
472 U.S. 274, 288 (quoting Pacific Stationary & Printing Co. v. Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983».
39. 472 U.S. at 293.
40. See supra note 11.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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competitor needs to operate, such as denial of access to market
information for a stockbrokerage, denial of required certification of
a product for a stove-manufacturer, denial of sources of news to a
news service, or denial of wholesale supplies to a retailer. 41 In each
of these types of cases, the likely anticompetitive animus may be
presumed; the anticompetitive impact is great and the likely procompetitive impact small. But expulsion from a wholesale co-operative does not necessarily imply anticompetitive animus; and unless
the co-operative possesses market power or exclusive access to an
element essential to effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is virtually always likely to have an anticompetitive effect is not
warranted. As stated by the Court:
A plaintiff seeking application of the per se rule must present
a threshold case that the challenged activity falls into a
category likely to have predominately anti-competitive impacts. The mere allegation of a concerted refusal to deal
does not suffice because not all concerted refusals to deal
are predominately anticompetitive. 42

c.

The Erosion of Per se Analysis: Services

The "typical" antitrust violation involves commodities. The
Clayton Act, for example, is specifically limited to "commodities in
interstate commerce."43 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,44 however,
one of the defenses raised by the Bar Association when its minimum
price list for attorneys' services was challenged as violative of the
Sherman Act was that "Congress never intended to include the
learned professions within the terms 'trade or commerce' in section
1 of the Sherman Act, and therefore the sale of professional services
is exempt from the Act. "45 The court of appeals had noted that
"there has long been judicial recognition of a limited exclusion of
'learned professions' from the scope of antitrust laws" because such
professions are state regulated. 46 The Supreme Court, however; found
no legislative support for the necessary exclusion of learnedprofessions from the Sherman Act.47 The Court did, however, strongly
suggest that antitrust violations of the Sherman Act, which might
41. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 274, 294 (1985) (citing examples of boycott conspiracies).
42. [d. at 298.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1993).
44. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
45. [d. at 786.
46. [d. at 779-80.
47. [d. at 786.
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properly be viewed as a per se violation in a context other than a
service industry, should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason: 48
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as
distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in
determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice
of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed
as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be
treated differently. 49
Not only, then, have the kinds of restraints considered per se violative
been decreasing in the context of commodities transactions, but in
the very first case questioning the Sherman Act's applicability in the
area of professional services the Court narrowed the scope of the
.law by suggesting that per se analysis was inappropriate.

D.

Per Se Analysis in the Health Care Field

In 1980 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
a "'boycott' characterization ... avails us little in determining
whether an agreement . . . is per se illegal. Because of the special
considerations involved in the delivery of health services,"5o the court
determined that a Rule of Reason analysis is appropriate. 51 The
Supreme Court specifically confirmed this holding in FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists. 52 A group of Indiana dentists formed what
they styled a "union" in order to promulgate a "work rule" that
required members to withhold X-rays requested by dental insurers
for use in evaluating claims. 53 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
issued a complaint against the Federation. The FTC claimed the
dentists' actions constituted a violation of section 5 of the Federal
48. "Rule of Reason" analysis requires a general inquiry into whether the challenged practice unreasonably restricts competition given all the circumstances.
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1910).
49. Gold/arb, 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17.
50. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d
.
476, 484-85 (4th Cir. 1980).
51. Id.
52. 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986).
53. Insurers examined the X-rays to determine whether the dentists' diagnostic and
treatment decisions were the most cost-effective, and the practice was "viewed
by some dentists as a threat to their professional independence and economic
well-being." Id. at 449.
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Trade Commission Act 54 because they amounted to a conspiracy in
restraint of trade and were therefore illegal as judged under the
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
Court found that the conspiracy existed and that it had resulted in
a restraint of trade. A restraint of trade, the Court observed, is only
illegal, however, if it is per se unreasonable or "because it violates
what has come to be known as the 'Rule of Reason."'55 The
Federation's policy could fairly be labelled a "group boycott," the
Court observed, but that did not render it per se illegal:
Although this Court has in the past stated that group
boycotts are unlawful per se, we decline to resolve this case
by forcing the Federation's policy into the "boycott" pigeonhole and invoking the per se rule. . . . [T]he category
of restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded
indiscriminately, and the per se approach has generally been
limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott
suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from
doing business with a competitor-a situation obviously not
present here .... [I]n general, [we have been reluctant] to
extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context
of business relationships where the economic impact of
certain practices is not immediately obvious. 56
The maintenance of high quality medical services is traditionally
policed by peer review groups. Physicians whose practices are substandard may be put on pr.obation; in egregious cases, physician
54. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. 1993).
55. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 457-58.
56. Id. at 458-59 (citations omitted). Finding a Rule of Reason violation with these
facts was "not a matter of any great difficulty," even without elaborate
market-definition and market-power analysis (which the IFD insisted was
needed), since there was no dispute that insurers in the locations "served" by
the IFD were actually unable to obtain cQmpliance with their requests for Xrays and, thus, could not possibly police costs: there were sustained adverse
effects on competition in the areas where the IFD dentists predominated. Id.
at 495. The IFD also claimed there could be no Rule of Reason violation
without a finding that the result of the "conspiracy" was an increase in prices.
Id. at 461-62. The Court disagreed: the withholding of information desired by
consumers for determining whether a purchase is cost-justified was obviously
likely to disrupt the market's price-setting mechanism, and no proof of price
impact was needed. Id. The IFD's final assertion, that non-competitive "quality
of care" justifications for the boycott of insurers should be considered was
dismissed too. Id. at 462-64. The Court said this amounted to the argument
that "an unrestrained market in which consumers are given access to the
information they believe will be relevant to their choices will lead them to
make unwise and even dangerous choices," which is "nothing less than a
frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act." Id. at 463.
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privileges are revoked upon recommendation by review committeesY
The reviewers in such a situation are, however, in a tenuous position.
They usually compete with the doctor whose medical standards are
in question. Not infrequently the doctor complains that the motivation to revoke his or her privileges is not the maintenance of high
standards, but his or her removal as a competitor. 58 The complaining
physician then becomes the plaintiff in a federal antitrust case claiming a group boycott in violation of antitrust laws.
Medical malpractice is a more complex problem than cut-rate
automobile selling, so group boycotts by peer review boards have
never been subject to the somewhat simplistic per se analysis; peerpolicing of malpracticioners is not automatically illegal. For example,
in Goss v. Memorial Hospital System,59 a Rule of Reason analysis
was applied where the plaintiff physician complained of being excluded from practice at hospitals by a denial of staff privileges. The
Fifth Circuit confirmed the district court's finding that mere expUlsion
does not imply anticompetitive animus. The court agreed that the
evidence failed to show that the hospitals possessed "market power
or unique access to a business element necessary for effective
competition"60 so that their boycotting of Dr. Goss denied him
competitive opportunities. 61
If the medical peer review process escapes per se analysis,
relegation to Rule of Reason proves dangerous for peer reviewer
defendants. It is an onerous business to mount a Rule of Reason
defense, as it requires a showing that the ostensibly anticompetitive
activity had a valid non-anticompetitive purpose (Le., the actors had
good faith).62 Even if the defendants are successful, the threat of
57. Peer review is one step in a long process by which unacceptable medical
practices are monitored, checked and reviewed. The peer review committee is
typically one of four committees involved. The final decision on hospital
privileges is made by the governing board.
58. See Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1037 (6th Cir. 1993) ("physicians
aggrieved by the results of peer review increasingly appeared in federal court
claiming that the actions of their peers were anti-competitive and violate federal
antitrust laws. ").
59. 789 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1986).
60. [d. at 355 (quoting Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary
& Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 291 (1985».
61. [d. at 355. The hospitals each had less than 6070 of the total beds in the county .
. [d.
62. See, e.g., Theater Enters. v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954). The plaintiff, a suburban movie theater owner, sued Paramount alleging
that its policy of restricting first-run motion pictures to downtown theaters was
a conspiracy in restraint of trade. [d. at 538. The distributors successfully
defended themselves by adducing evidence of the economies of movie distribution: the necessity of an adequate population base (not found in suburban
areas), available public transportation, and greater opportunities for advertising.
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costly and traumatic litigation chills vigorous peer review, and therefore increases the likelihood of poorly policed medicaf practice, and
increases malpractice insurance rates.
III. THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
OF f9"86 (HCQIA)

A.

The Purpose and Background of the HCQIA

Since the effective date of the HCQIA in October 1989, participants in physician peer review processes who are acting in good
faith have a better defense than the Rule of Reason. Congress adopted
the HCQIA to encourage effective physician peer review by discouraging the threat of private antitrust action against critical reviewers.63
The Act provides a limited exception from antitrust liability to the
peer review group, any person acting as a member or staff to the
body, any person acting under contract with the body, and any
person participating with the body.64 No immunity is provided,
however, from actions by the Federal Trade Commission, the United
States Department of Justice, or state or federal attorneys genera1.6~
Immunity from malpractice actions is likewise not available. 66 The
Act also sets up a national clearinghouse for information regarding
physicians. 67
[d. at 540. The Supreme Court affirmed a finding that refusal to grant first-

run licenses to suburban theaters was - considering the "adequate explanation"
- within the Rule of Reason. [d. at 540-42. Demonstrating such "adequate
expl~nation" is of course time consuming and expensive. As to the evidence
necessary to show "good faith" in the medical peer review arena, see section
IlI.D., infra.
63. H.R. REp. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6384. This provides in relevant part:
The purpose of this legislation is to improve the quality of medical
care by encouraging physicians to identify and discipline other physicians who are incompetent or who engage in unprofessional behavior.
Under this bill, hospitals and physicians that conduct peer review
will be protected from damages in suits by physicians who lose their
hospital privileges, provided the peer review actions meet the due
process and other standards established in the bill. In addition, hospitals and physicians that discipline doctors will be required to report
these disciplinary actions to the state medical boards. In turn, the
state medical boards will be required to forward this information to
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services ....
[d. at 6384.
64. 42 U.S.C. § lllll(a)(l) (1993).
65. [d. § 1l1l1(a)(I).
66. [d. § 1133(c)(I).
67. [d. § 1134(b).
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The United States House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee was primarily responsible for drafting the Act. The
Committee reported as follows:
This bill is needed to deal with one important aspect of the
medical malpractice problem in this country-incompetent
and unprofessional -physicians. It does not address the malpractice insurance crisis, which has extremely complex and
controversial origins and cannot be solved through peer
review. The bill's focus is. on those instances in which
physicians injure patients through incompetent or unprofessional service, are identified as incompetent or unprofessional by their medical colleagues, but are dealt with in a
way that allows them to continue to injure patients.
Unfortunately, groups such as state licensing boards, hospitals and medical societies that should be weeding out
incompetent or unprofessional doctors often do not do so.
Even when such bodies do act against bad physicians, these
physicians find it all too easy to move to different hospitals
or states and continue their practices in these new 10cations. 68
The Committee specifically referred to the damaging effect on
effective peer review of both the threat of antitrust litigation and
high malpractice insurance rates:
The reporting system [proposed in this legislation], however,
creates a major problem. Many people in the medical field
told the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment that
the reporting system would inevitably result in an enormous
increase in litigation. The reason: faced with the certainty
that they can no longer hide their past records, physicians
facing disciplinary action will feel compelled to challenge
vigorously any action taken against them. Based on recent
experience, the Committee believes that many of these physicians will file antitrust' lawsuits.
Even though defendants may often win these lawsuits,
that may not be sufficient to guarantee enthusiastic, or even
minimally adequate, peer review .... Doctors who are sufficiently fearful of the threat of litigation will simply not
do meaningful peer review. The result would be to continue
the possibility for abuse by bad doctors.69

68. H.R. REp. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6384-85.
.
69. [d. at 6385.
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B. Application of the HCQIA
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act76 was interpreted for
the first time in Austin v. McNamara.71 At age 65, Dr. George Austin
retired as Chairman of the Lorna Linda University School of Medicine.72 He had spent his entire medical career as an instructor and
professor of neurosurgery.73 Subsequently, he took up private practice
at the Cottage Hospital in Santa Barbara, California. 74 Within five
years the Cottage Hospital Medical Executive Committee was concerned enough about Dr. Austin's performance to establish an ad
hoc committee "to investigate concerns voiced by the staff that
Plaintiff Dr. Austin was providing substandard care to his patients
at the hospital." 75 Dr. Austin was suspended from practicing at
Cottage Hospital for seven months, after which he was reinstated
subject to various conditions. 76 Dr. Austin sued the hospital and five
physicians, claiming they conspired to restrain him from competing
against them. 77
The defendants moved for a summary judgment, claiming that
the HCQIA immunized them from antitrust liability.7s The district
court agreed. To invoke the Act's protection, a defendant must show
three things: (1) that the professional review actions complied with
standards set forth in 42 U.S.C. section 11112; (2) that the results
of the professional review actions were properly reported to state
authorities in compliance with the Act; and (3) that the actions
occurred after November 14, 1986, the effective date of the Act. 79
For a professional review action to comply with the Act, section
11112(a) provides that it must be taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the
furtherance of quality health care,
(2) after. a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the
matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances,
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted
by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

42 U.S.C. § 11101 (1993).
731 F. Supp. 934 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
[d. at 935.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 936.
[d. at 937-38.
[d. at 935.
Id: at 938.
[d. at 939.
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facts and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).80
There was no serious question in the case that the defendants
satisfied every requirement. Summary judgment was therefore granted
in their favor.
C.

Limitations on Usefulness of the HCQIA

The HCQIA is no panacea for the problems of medical professional peer review. One commentator observed in an early review of
the Act that it might have only limited utility:
The Act seems likely to affect only one aspect of malpractice
problems-the severe or repeat offender, who is meant to
be curtailed in her career prospects. All hospitals or other
entities hiring a physician are required to check the data
bank for information about that physician; what they do
with the information is up to them. This duty means that,
should a problem develop, employers who do not check
may face a lawsuit at some future date for negligent failure
to monitor physicians .... Otherwise, the Act contains no
enforcement mechanisms. The Act may very indirectly affect
quality more broadly through its encouragement of hospital
peer review; it gives limited immunity from liability for
participation in review activities. 81
Indeed, prospects that the Act would encourage hospital peer
review were dimmed by the first United States Supreme Court case
to consider - albeit indirectly - the Act. The problem is that the
Act gives limited immunity only; bad faith peer review is not protected. If the mere allegation that there h.as been bad faith review
against a single doctor is sufficient to trigger federal antitrust jurisdiction, the prospects of vigorous peer reviews are chilled, for reviewers know they may face a daunting and expensive civil antitrust
action.
Whether federal jurisdiction under the Sherman Act reaches the
typical peer review case was considered by the Supreme Court in
Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas. 82 In that case, the Court held that
80. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1993).
81. Bovbjerg, supra note I, at 538. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit confirmed that the HCQIA provides only limited immunity when
it ruled that the Act does not provide among its protections the right not to
stand trial: "all the statutory language accomplishes with certainty is to shield
peer reviewers from liability for payment of damages .... [It] does not confer
a right not to stand trial .... " Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th
Cir. 1993).
82. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, III S. Ct. 1842 (1991).
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the Sherman Act did in fact apply. The Pin has case involved Dr.
Simon J. Pirihas, an eye surgeon, who became embroiled with the
Midway Hospital Medical Center in a dispute about staffing levels.
He was able to perform eye surgery more cheaply than his peers
because he did not need an assistant and Medicare had stopped
funding for the second doctor. 83 To make Dr. Pinhas's services as
expensive as the other doctors' (who used the second surgeon), the
hospital presented him with what he called "a sham contract" to
sign by which he would receive $36,000 (later orally increased to
$60,(00) a year for services he would not be asked to perform. 84 Dr.
Pinhas refused to execute the contract. 85 Ultimately Dr. Pinhas's staff
privileges were suspended, and the suspension was affirmed by the
Midway Executive Committee.86 He then sought and obtained a
hearing by the Midway Judicial Review Committee, which upheld
only one of the seven charges against him and recommended rein- .
statement subject to several special conditions. 87 This decision was
then appealed to the Governing Board of the Hospital, which affirmed the decision of the Judicial Review Committee, but imposed
more stringent conditions upon Pinhas's probationary period. 88 Notice
of Pinhas's termination was disseminated to hospitals in California
and throughout the entire country pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections
11133 and 11135. 89 Pinhas claimed that, as a result of this action,
the hospital had effectively boycotted his practice and precluded him
from continued participation in the marketplace;90 he thereafter
brought a Sherman Act action against the hospital and the doctors
who served on the review panel. 91 The district court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss on the pleadings and Dr. Pinhas
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.92
When the case reached the court of appeals, the hospital claimed
the federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Sherman Act claim
because there was no adequate showing of "a required nexus with
interstate commerce. "93 The court noted that the test set out by the
Supreme Court was whether "'as a matter of practical economics'
the Hospital's activities have a 'not insubstantial effect on the inter-

83. Id. at 1845.
84.Id.
85. Id.
86.Id.
87.Id.
88. Id. at 1846 n.5.
89. Id. at 1845.
9O.Id.
91. Id. at 1843.
92.Id.
93. Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024, 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1989).
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state commerce involved.'''94 Construing this language, the court
said:
Pinhas need not ... make [a] more particularized showing
of the effect on interstate commerce caused by the alleged
conspiracy to keep him from working. He need only prove
that peer-review proceedings have an effect on interstate
commerce, a fact that can hardly be disputed. The proceeding affected the entire staff at Midway and thus affect the
hospital's interstate commerce. Appellees' contention that
Pinhas failed to allege a nexus with interstate commerce
because the absence of Pinhas's services will not drastically
affect the interstate commerce of Midway therefore misses
the mark and must be rejected. 9s
From the adverse Ninth Circuit decision on the antitrust issue,
the hospital sought and was granted certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court examined whether Dr. Pinhas's complaint satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act. 96 Because
the case came before the Court following the trial court's granting
a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the truth of the allegations
was assumed. Specifically, the Court assumed that Pinhas's medical
staff privileges were revoked after an unfair peer review process and
that the hospital intended-under the HCQIA-to disseminate the
peer review board's conclusions about his unfitness so as to '''preclude him from continued competition in the market place, not only
at the defendant Midway Hospital [but also] ... in California, if
not the United States.'''97
In affirming the court of appeals, the Court noted the Sherman
Act requires that complaints brought under its aegis allege that
interstate commerce is affected by the conspiracy claimed. 98 The
hospital argued that the boycott of a single surgeon has no significant
effect on interstate commerce, the complaint alleged no lack of an
adequate supply of other surgeons to perform the services, and there
was then "no factual nexus between the restraint on this one sur-

94. Id. at 1031-32.
95. [d. at 1034. Dr. Pinhas had also sought a declaratory judgment that the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152) was un-

constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1025. The district court
had dismissed this claim, and the court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that the
appellees "are not the appropriate parties to defend a constitutional challenge
to the relevant . . . federal statutes," because "the appellees had no interest
in the enforcement of ... the federal regulation." [d. at 1034-35.
96. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991).
97. Id. at 1846 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
98. [d.
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geon's practice and interstate commerce."99 The Court, however, held
that the alleged restraint of trade, accomplished by misuse of a
congressionally regulated peer review process, resulted in foreclosing
Pinhas's access to the market for ophthalmological services provided
by hospitals in the Los Angeles area and therefore "ha[d] a sufficient
nexus with interstate commerce to support federal jurisdiction." HlO
The dissent, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, lamented the decision because it
made federal jurisdiction turn not on the effect on commerce of the
restraint, nor to the effect on commerce of the defendants' "infected
activities," 101 but "rather, it seems, to the effect on commerce of
the activity from which the plaintiff has been excluded."lo2 The
dissenters felt that the effect of this conspiracy, if successful, would
not significantly impact interstate commerce. The proposed agreement, for example, would only have affected Dr. Pinhas's practice
at Midway, and could have no effect on the larger Los Angeles
market, much less interstate commerce. I03 Klors lO4 also involved only
one small player in a much larger field, but in Klors the conspiracy
was broader than an "in-house" dispute; it involved manufacturers
and distributors. Moreover, as Justice Scalia observed, the Klors
Court specifically noted that the conspiracy "interfere[d] with the
free flow .of commerce," whereas in this case, no such interference
was ever alleged.lOs Justice Scalia summed up his concern about the
impact of the decision as follows:
Federal courts are an attractive forum, and the treble damages of the Clayton Act an attractive remedy. We have
today made them available for routine business torts, needlessly destroying a sensible statutory allocation of federalstate responsibility and contributing to the trivialization of
the federal courtS. I06
99. Id. at 1847.
100. Id. at 1848.

101. The term is from McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232
(1980). Justice Scalia observed that the term had caused great disagreement
among the courts. Pinhas, III S. Ct. at 1850. It is difficult, he wrote, to
determine "which 'activities of the defendants' are 'infected'? Are they all the
activities of the hospital? Only the activities of the eye surgery department?
The entire practice of eye surgeons who use the hospital? Or, as the Ninth
Circuit apparently found in this case, the peer review process itself?" Id.
(citations omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1850-51.
104. 59 U.S. 207 (1959).
105. Pin has, III S. Ct. at 1851. Justice Scalia wrote: "The complaint does not
begin to suggest that the conspiracy at Midway could have even the most
trivial effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 1853.
106. Id. at 1854.
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The HCQIA may be "two steps forward and one step back,"
but medical professionals confronting antitrust complaints have two
other ditches to defend: increased use of summary judgment in their
favor and the increased use of the absolute defense of state-action
immunity. The former holds some promise; the latter is still noman's land. Before considering these defenses, however, it is appropriate to examine a more immediately obvious defense. The HCQIA
is not useless; it does afford some protection against antitrust suits
provided, among other things, the professional review action was
taken in the "reasonable belief that [it] was in the furtherance of
quality health care. "107 To act on a belief that they are furthering
quality health care, however, the actors must have some standard
against which to measure the caregiving expected by practitioners
and the care actually delivered.

D.

Showing "Good Faith:" The HCQIA's Defense
The claim made against the reviewers is typically that the board
is unjustly pursuing a competent physician. The fact is there are bad
doctors. Not all malpractice claims are frivolous; good practitioners
and good hospitals are concerned about quality, and with good
reason. lOS
Of course, malpractice is not typical of what transpires in wellrun hospitals. But no one doubts there are bad doctors, just as there
are bad lawyers and bad roofers. A bad roofer's work may be evident
because the finished job is unsightly, or because the roof leaks. A
bad doctor's work is evident if his or her patients have a higher
infection rate than others, if he or she uses more blood than the
norm, if the patient makes an inadequate recovery from a procedure
which does not usually result in such complications, or if the patient
unexpectedly dies. But using more blood than usual, without more,
is not proof of malpractice, nor is the death of the patient. What is
needed are standards against which medical care can be measured to
determine if substandard care has been provided.
1.

Standards Against Which Hospital Care-Giving is Measured

a.

The Joint Commission's Standards
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) is the industry's chief regulator. The Accreditation
107. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(1) (1993).
108. See, e.g., WALT BOGDANICH, THE GREAT WHITE LIE: How AMERICA'S HOSPITALS
BETRAY OUR TRUST AND ENDANGER OUR LIVES (1991). The book, carefully
documented if somewhat sensationalist, draws on more than 15 years of
reporting on the hospital industry to argue that incidence of serious malpractice
by doctors, nurses, and staff are "not mere freak accidents or anomalies, [but)
the direct result of systemic health care problems of enormous proportions."
Id. at 10.
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Manual for hospitals contains lists or schedules of standards and a
"1 to 5" scale for determining the degree of compliance with the
standards. 109 Hospitals are subject to periodic inspection by accreditation examiners, and must show adequate compliance with the
. standards. 110
The problem with the JCAHO standards is that they are not
specific. For example, a typical standard is that "activities are
conducted to prevent and control infections in patients and personnel."llI Another standard states "adequate infection control devices
and supplies to be available in patient care areas."JJ2 Exactly what
the procedures are, or how many units of contaminate bacteria may
be tolerated in a test swab, is not set out. A more specific type of
standard would be "Not more than 15 cc of blood should be used
during a routine appendectomy," but this type of standard is not
provided. Although the national boards for certifying specialists are
having increasing influence on the locally applied "normal" performance limits, most hospitals develop their own standards. JJ3
Even specific standards, however, are not a perfect measure of
good care-giving. Suppose, for example, that a particular doctor has
an infection rate three times that of other doctors. Several factors
could be the cause: operative technique, hardware, use of antibiotics,
or perhaps post-operative treatment. Isolating the cause is not easy;
usually it is not one thing, but a systemic problem. A review of
patient care is of course necessary.

b.

Hospital Quality Assurance Programs

Hospitals that have good quality assurance programs promulgate
standards of care usually in a document such as a Hospital Quality
Management Plan.1 14 The standards generally provide for on-going
reviews such as monitoring medical staff functions (Le., review of
surgical cases, blood usage, medical records, drug usage), provisional
status review, and special (focused) reviews. A showing that peer
review procedures were conducted in good faith, as is required by
the HCQIA, is based on a demonstration that there are reasonably

109. 2 JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGS., ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR Hosps. (1994) [hereinafter JCAHCO MANUAL].
110. Interview with Dr. John S. Moore, Ph.D, President of the St. Joseph Hospital
Board of Trustees, in Bellingham, WA (May 7, 1992); interview with Catherine
Anderson, R.N., Director, Quality Management Services, St. Joseph Hospital,
in Bellingham, WA (May 24, 1992 and September 8, 1994).
Ill. JCAHCO MANUAL, supra note 109, § IC 1.3.2, at 122.
112. [d. § IC 1.3 .2.l.l, at 122.
113. Interview with Catherine Anderson, supra note 110.
fl4. JCAHCO MANUAL, supra note 109, § LD .4, at 34.

288

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 22

established standards and an on-going program to compare practice
to the standards.

Computerized Statistical Quality Control
In progressive hospitals the results of on-going reviews are fed
into computer files as data modules, numerically identified by the
practitioner .IIS The modules might include information on each physician's blood usage for a particular surgical operation, infection
control records, drug usage reviews, and information from the patient
files such as procedures, diagnoses, consultants, and special studies.
This information may be variously manipulated. For the purposes of
quality assurance, it is abstracted and automatically compared to the
hospital norms. A doctor's practices that are outside the norms will
be flagged by the program, and a review may commence. 1I6
c.

2.

Peer Review Procedures
If comparing a practitioner's performance to the hospital norms
raises concerns, peer review is appropriate. This process should follow
a set procedure in order to avoid the appearance of any ad hoc
activity. The record of on-going reviews should have noted any
concerns, typically designated as "minor" (a practice outside the
standard of care, with the risk of morbidity but not adverse outcome,
or a problem without potential significant adverse effects), "moderate" (a practice resulting in avoidable patient morbidity, or a
potential for significant adverse effects), or "major" (clearly outside
the standards, that results or could 'result in significant morbidity or
death).117 If the reviews reveal practices serious enough to warrant
more than minor corrective suggestions, further investigation is undertaken. The practitioner is usually provided an opportunity to
comment at this stage, and these comments become part of the review
file. liS The procedure should provide for interdepartmental communication, disposition and confidentiality of the peer review records
thus created, and of multiple review levels.lI9
3. Use of Statistical Quality Control in the "Good Faith"
Defense
The Joint Commission's standards should be the basis for promulgation of more specific in-hospital quality care criteria. 120 These
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Interviews with John Moore and Catherine Anderson, supra note 110.
[d.

[d.
[d.
[d. See also Bovbjerg, supra note 1.
See JCAHCO MANUAL, supra note 109.
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locally-developed standards may be statistically compared to the
practitioner's delivery, and if the delivery is sub-standard, the record
of the statistical quality control system may stand as evidence that
peer review actions were taken in good faith. Such standards provide
a defense based on well-documented criteria indicating incompetence.
IV. OTHER ANTITRUST DEFENSES: ANTITRUST
IMMUNITY, INCREASED USE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A.

State Action Immunity: Use of Absolute Defenses

The Parker doctrine asserts that the Sherman Act does not apply
to anti competitive actions of a state. In Parker v. Brown,121 the
petitioner was a raisin grower. 122 He brought suit against the California Director of Agriculture to enjoin the enforcement of a marketing plan. 123 The plan had been adopted under a state agricultural
adjustment act and was designed to reduce competition among food
producers in the state so as to stabilize prices. 124 The Court created
the Parker doctrine, consisting of a rigorous two prong test, to
determine if the state action exemption would shield anti competitive
acts taken by private parties. 12s Specifically, "the challenged restraint
must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy,"'I26 and the anticompetitive act "must be 'actively supervised
by the State itself."'127 In Parker, the Court found no conspiracy
because no contract was made by the state agency.l28
One might expect that because medical peer review boards are
established according to law and supervised by the Board of Medical
Examiners l29 and the state judicial system they would be within the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

317 U.S. 341 (1943).
[d. at 344.
[d.
[d. at 346.
[d. at 350.
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988) (citations omitted).
[d. (citations omitted).
Parker, 317 U.S. at 352.
See Bovbjerg, supra note 1 and text accompanying notes 84-92 regarding
"legislative enactments" aimed at medical quality. For example, the Revised
Code of Washington Annotated provides that a "state medical disciplinary
board ... [which] shall be an administrative agency of the state," and it has
authority, under § 18.130.050 to investigate claims of medical malpractice, hold
hearings, and deny, revoke, or suspend licenses to practice medicine under
§ 18.130.120. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.72.040 (West 1989). See also
Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 (noting that the State of Oregon actively supervises
the peer review process through the State Health Division, the Board of Medical
Examiners, and the judicial system).
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Parker exemption. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has held other~
wise in a recent decision. In Patrick v. Burget,130 Dr. Timothy Patrick,
petitioner, was an Astoria, Oregon, surgeon who declined an invitation by respondents to join them as a partner in the Astoria Clinic
and instead began an independent practice in competition with them. 131
The clinic doctors then effectively blackballed him: they shunned
him, refused to refer patients to him, and "showed reluctance to
assist petitioner with his own patients. "132 They also refused to
provide backup coverage for his patients, and criticized him for
having none. 133 Ultimately, at the request of one of the clinic surgeons, the executive committee of the Columbia Memorial Hospital
voted to recommend the termination of Patrick's privileges because
his patient care was "substandard."I34 Columbia Memorial was the
only hospital in Astoria, and a majority of its staff members were
employees of the clinic. I3S Patrick sued in federal court alleging a
violation of the Sherman Act; the jury found for Patrick and awarded
$650,000, which was trebled by operation of the Sherman Act's
provision for treble damages. 136 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, while admitting that the respondents' treatment of Dr. Patrick was "shabby, unprincipled and unprofessional"137 nevertheless
reversed. It found the respondents' actions within the Parker exemption because the State Health Division, the Board of Medical Examiners, and the state judiciary constituted active state supervision. 138
The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that the Oregon Health
Division's authority only related to procedures and did not encompass
ultimate authority over private privilege determinations. 139 The Board
of Medical Examiners' principal function was to regulate the licensing
of physicians, and it had no power to disapprove private privilege
decisions. l40 The Court also found that the state judiciary did not
exercise active supervision because all that Oregon case law allowed
was a review to determine if due process -requirements were met;
thus, the judicial supervision fell "far short of satisfying the active
supervision requirement." 141 The Court recognized that fear of antitrust litigation might chill peer review activity, but observed that if
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

486 U.S. 94 (1988).
[d. at 96.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 97.
[d. at 96.
[d. at 98.
Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986).
[d. at 1506.
Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102.
[d. at 103.
[d. at 104.
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antitrust laws are indeed not to apply to medical care, the legislature
should make that determination, not the judiciary. 142
Shortly after Patrick was decided, the Eleventh Circuit considered a similar case. In Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center
("HHMC"),143 Dr. Bolt was denied privileges by three hospitals in
the Daytona Beach, Florida area after he refused to undertake
psychiatric counselling following allegations of wrongdoing. l44 He
sued the members of the peer review panels and the hospitals,
alleging, inter alia, an antitrust violation.J45 The defendants raised
the Parker exemption as a defense. l46 An appeals panel determined
that in Florida there is sufficient judicial oversight of private peer
review panels to constitute "state action": the courts will review the
fairness of the procedures, the validity of the criteria used (compared
to state policy), and the sufficiency of the evidence. 147 The private
hospital, the hospital special taxing district and members of their
medical staffs involved in the peer review were immune. l48
The case was then heard en banc, and the full panel vacated the
prior decision because the private party defendants formally withdrew
any claim that they were immune from antitrust liability under the
state-action doctrine. 149 Thereafter, the panel reconsidered the case. 150
At this second hearing, the HHMC withdrew its claim that it was
immune as a private party, developing two new state action arguments. The hospital first argued· that it was a state agency, or was
entitled to the status of such because it was closely supervised by the
state.15I The court found it was not a state agency.152 Moreover, it
opined that even if it were a state agency, had it nevertheless engaged
in a conspiracy, such would be outside the Parker rule. 153 Furthermore, the court determined that HHMC was not so actively super142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

[d. at 105.
851 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir. 1988).
[d. at 1276-77.
[d. at 1277.
[d. at 1279 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943».
[d. at 1283-84. Patrick, however, would apparently require more than that.
The Supreme Court said "active supervision mandates that the State exercise
ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct." Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988). Review of procedure, validity of criteria, and
sufficiency of evidence may result in a decision to overrule the peer review
panel, but it is not really "ultimate control" over the decision. [d.
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Ctr., , 851 F.2d 1273, 1284 (11th Cir. 1988).
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 874 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1990).
[d. at 823.
[d.
"When a state agency joins in a private anticompetitive agreement not required
by the state, the agency loses its protected status under Parker." [d. at 823
n.23 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-92 (1975».
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vised by the state as to qualify for the special status of statesovereign. ls4 The hospital's second argument was that, even if it were
not a state agency, it was the equivalent of a municipality and
therefore exempt from antitrust laws under the Town of Hallie
doctrine. ISS The court did agree that as a special county taxing district
the HHMC had some quasi-municipal attributes, and recognized that
the legislature's grant of peer review power to the Center contemplated some kind of boycott against doctors who were denied privileges. ls6 The court reasoned, however, that the allegations involved
actions ultra vires and went beyond the protection afforded by Parker
and its progeny.1S7 HHMC, therefore, was not entitled to immunity.
In the Pin has case lS8 the defendant hospital also raised the "state
action" defense. ls9 Applying the Patrick test, however, the Ninth
Circuit found inadequate active state supervision, and concluded,
therefore, that acts of the hospital were not immune from challenge
under the state action defense. l60 The issue was not raised on appeal
to the Supreme Court.

B.

Increased Use of Summary Judgment

The Supreme Court has enhanced defendants' prospects in group
boycott antitrust actions, including medical professional actions, by
effectively removing them from per se analysis. The Court eroded
defendants' prospects under the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act by allowing ready invocation of federal antitrust jurisdiction
upon a mere claim of bad faith in the "group boycott" process.
Attempts by non-pUblic medical facilities to use the absolute defense
154. /d. at 824.
155. The Town 0/ Hallie doctrine provides "that when a municipality engages in
anticompetitive conduct pursuant to 'a clearly expressed state policy', the
conduct constitutes state action for the purposes of Parker even without a
showing of active state supervision." [d. at 825 (quoting Town of Hallie v.
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985».
156. [d. at 825.
157. [d. The court found no evidence to support the community-wide conspiracy
claim holding that: (1) evidence of parallel action by the hospitals proved
nothing; (2) that inter-hospital communication about Dr. Bolt could have been
for a legitimate independent business purpose; and (3) that the direct evidence
that decision makers at the hospitals agreed among themselves to take concerted
action to drive Dr. Bolt out of the Daytona Beach area could be interpreted
as being nothing more than evidence that decision makers at each hospital
based their decisions partly on matters that occurred at the other two hospitals.
[d. at 826-27. However, the court then held that the district court had
erroneously prohibited Dr. Bolt from submitting other evidence of a community-wide conspiracy, and the case was remanded. [d. at 827-28.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 82-107.
159. Pinhas v. Summit Health Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1989).
160. [d. at 1029-30.
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of government immunity have not received favorable judicial treatment.
There is, however, one last area to examine. The Supreme Court
has eased the defendant's burden by changing the criteria by which
the plaintiff's case can be dismissed on summary judgment. In
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 161 respondents Zenith and other American manufacturers of consumer electronic products brought an action in district court in 1974 alleging
that Matsushita and other Japanese firms were "dumping" televisions
in the United States (Le., selling them in the United States for less
than the same product was sold for in Japan).162 After several years
of discovery, the petitioners moved for summary judgment, upon
which the district court directed the parties to file statements listing
all the documentary evidence that would be offered if the case were
tried. 163 Finding that the bulk of the respondents' evidence would be
inadmissible and that what was left did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to the existence of any conspiracy and that any
inference of conspiracy was unreasonable, the district court granted
petitioners' motion. l64 The court of appeals then reversed, finding
that much of the excluded evidence would be admissible and that
there was both direct and circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy
sufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to find a conspiracy to
depress prices in the United States. 165
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, reinstating
the district court's summary judgment. The Court reviewed the
requirements for successfully resisting a summary judgment: there
must be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners
entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer
a cognizable- injury.l66 But, the Court said, if the claims made by the
respondents are simply implausible-if they make no economic sensethen respondents must come forward with more evidence to support
their claim than would otherwise be reasonable in order to convince
a court that there is a material issue of fact.167 To orchestrate a
conspiracy among as many firms over as long a time as here alleged
would be extremely difficult; it would require years of losses before
there would be any profitable effect followed by years of high profits
to recoup the losses. l68 The Court noted that there was no evidence
161. 475 u.S. 574 (1986).
162. Id. at 577-78.
163. Id. at 578.
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of the alleged conspiracy's success after 20 years: RCA and Zenith
continued to hold the largest share of the color television market
notwithstanding the alleged conspiracy and decreasing prices. 169 If it
had not worked after so long a period, the Court said, it probably
never existed yo Moreover, if the petitioners here had been selling
their televisions at a low profit, it is possible that they were just
better competitors; it would defeat the whole purpose· of antitrust
law if factfinders could infer conspiracies even where such inferences
are implausible. 171 On remand, the Court said that the court of
appeals would be "free to consider whether there is other evidence
that is sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find that
petitioners conspired to price predatorily for two decades despite the
absence of any apparent motive to do SO,"172 but this evidence must
"tend to exclude the possibility" that the underpricing was procompetitive rather than an anti-competitive, "economically senseless
conspiracy."173 The Ninth Circuit summarized the Supreme Court's
Matsushita decision in T. W. Electrical Service v. Pacific Electrical
Contractors Ass'n.174 The court stated:
Where an antitrust plaintiff's allegation of a conspiracy is
based solely on indirect evidence that is capable of inferences
of both lawful and unlawful behavior, the plaintiff must
produce some evidence tending to exclude the possibility
that the defendant acted independently. If the plaintiff does
not produce such evidence or provide a reason for not doing
so .. . a grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant is appropriate. 17s
In the area of medical peer review, the mere fact that physicians
who sit on peer review boards within a hospital may have the power
to exclude direct competitors from that hospital will not inoculate
the plaintiff's case against summary judgment dismissal. In Cooper
v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority, Inc.,176 doctors Carlos T.
Cooper, Jr. and E. Joseph Daniels brought a private antitrust action.
The two were licensed podiatrists who had sought hospital privileges
for the performance of certain surgical operations allowed under
North Carolina licensing statutes. 177 The bylaws of the hospital re169. [d. at 591.
170. [d. at 592.
171. [d. at 593-94.
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stricted surgical privileges to physicians and dentists, excluding podiatrists. 178 A hospital bylaws committee undertook hearings on
whether the hospital bylaws should be amended.179 Orthopedic surgeons with surgical privileges participated in the hearings and objected
to proposed amendments: "[i]n the event podiatrists were granted
surgical privileges, podiatrists and orthopedists arguably would compete to perform certain surgical procedures." 180 Although the evidence
was clear that the orthopedists and the North Carolina Orthopedic .
Association discussed the issue, that orthopedists appeared before
the bylaws committee and that the recommendation adverse to the
podiatrists followed, this was not sufficient to overcome a motion
to dismiss}81 The evidence was insufficient to support the inference
of a conspiracy, and-as one might imagine-there were affidavits
from the defendants denying any anti-competitive animus and asserting that their opposition to granting podiatrists surgical privileges
was based on quality of patient care grounds}82
V.

CONCLUSION
Medical professionals confronted with a loss of hospital privileges by action of a peer review panel will not successfully invoke
the traditional per se antitrust analysis. Per se analysis has clearly
eroded, even when the line of commerce is commodities. It is certainly
clear that "group boycotts" by professionals are not subject to per
se condemnation; rather, they are judged by the Rule of Reason.
While the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 immunizes
good faith peer review actions, an allegation of bad faith is easy to
make and apparently automatically qualifies a case for federal antitrust jurisdiction. The chilling effect of possible litigation, therefore,
continues to hamper effective peer review activity. The Joint Com. mission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has recently
revised its accreditation standards. 183 These are inadequate to be
useful in setting specific standards of care, but they do provide a
framework within which more specific standards can be developed
by hospitals. The rigorous adoption and policing of standards, augmented by computerized quality reporting can create a solid record
of the quality of a physician's care-giving. If that record is poor, it .
prevents an objective and defensible method of demonstrating that
any peer review action was taken in good faith.
178.
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JCAHCO MANUAL, supra note 109. It is considered revised compared to
previous editions.
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Non-public defendant hospitals have not been able to successfully
invoke the "governmental immunity" antitrust exemption because
courts have been unwilling to find that these health care facilities
possess the required governmental attributes. Defendants may, however, prevail on a summary judgment dismissal if the plaintiff does
not produce some admissible evidence which tends to exclude the
possibility that there was a good faith reason for the boycott.
Maintaining, policing and recording of standards remains the best
insurance against incompetent and unprofessional care-giving, and
the best defense against the threat of antitrust litigation.

